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ABSTRACT 11 
Understanding the causal relationships between safety management system (SMS) factors and 12 
accident precursors helps construction organizations identify which factors require improvement 13 
upon observing an accident precursor. Previous research has not clearly distinguished between 14 
SMS factors and accident precursors. This background examines the relationships between SMS 15 
factors and accident precursors using empirical data. Specifically, five structural equation models 16 
(SEMs) are developed to map causal paths between SMS factors and accident precursors. Each of 17 
the SEMs helps identify what specific SMS factors would have a significant influence on the 18 
occurrence of a particular type of accident precursor. These models can thus help describe what 19 
specific SMS factors would need to be improved when a certain type of accident precursors 20 
appears on site. The SEM results show in particular that the occurrence of accident precursors can 21 
be attributed largely to adverse project conditions such as project schedule pressure, reworks, and 22 
change orders. Construction organizations may capitalize on these findings by prioritizing safety 23 
management resources to address specific observed accident precursors in a more informed and 24 
targeted manner. 25 
INTRODUCTION  26 
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The causes of accidents are complex, but we may briefly say that an accident occurs when a series 27 
of undesired events occur in sequence (Saleh et al. 2013). In an attempt to halt the onset of the 28 
sequence of unfortunate events resulting in accidents, multi-pronged and systemic approaches to 29 
safety management have been implemented in construction. Known collectively as a Safety 30 
Management System (SMS), such multidimensional integrative efforts have involved site 31 
management planning, hazard identification and risk mitigation, project safety rules and policies, 32 
site inspection, training, consultation, worker engagement, accident investigation/analysis, and 33 
safety performance evaluation. This integrated approach has been found effective, and has since 34 
significantly contributed to enhancing safety performance on construction sites over the last two 35 
decades (Robson et al. 2007; Wachter and Yorio 2014; Bottani et al. 2009).    36 
The factors affecting the performance of SMS can be referred to as SMS factors (Pereira et al. 37 
2018), while the undesirable events that precede and indicate the approach of an accident can be 38 
referred to as accident precursors (Kunreuther et al. 2004). Based on these definitions, SMS factors 39 
and accident precursors are conceptually distinguishable, and accident precursors can be 40 
understood as resulting from the misperformance of SMS with SMS factors being the root causes. 41 
However, the understanding of the causal links between SMS factors and accident precursors is 42 
currently limited (Patel and Jha 2016). This is problematic because the root causes of an accident 43 
precursor can be misidentified if there is no clear understanding of which SMS factors are 44 
connected with which specific accident precursors. In turn, misidentification of the causes of 45 
accident precursors may result in the inefficient use of safety management resources by addressing 46 
less relevant SMS factors. To address this problem, this paper investigates the causal relationships 47 
between various SMS factors and accident precursors based on empirical data collected from 48 
construction practitioners about the condition of SMS factors and the likelihood of accident 49 
precursors. An improved understanding of the relationships between these variables is expected to 50 
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contribute to advancing proactive safety management approaches in construction projects. With 51 
an improved understanding, construction managers can identify the most relevant SMS factors 52 
related to an observed accident precursor.  53 
RESEARCH BACKGROUNDS AND KNOWLEDGE GAPS 54 
Safety Management System (SMS)  55 
A SMS can be defined as a set of integrated safety practices designed to achieve occupational 56 
health and safety (OHS) objectives on construction sites (Fernandez-Muniz et al. 2007; Robson et 57 
al. 2007; Wachter and Yorio 2014). SMSs are multidimensional, inclusive, holistic, proactive, and 58 
oriented toward the continuous improvement of safety (Robson et al. 2007). Their integration into 59 
organizational processes allows construction organizations to more easily comply with OHS 60 
regulations (Fernandez-Muniz et al. 2009). The use of SMSs is mandatory in many countries 61 
including the USA, the UK, Australia, Hong Kong, and Singapore (Ai et al 2006); however, SMSs 62 
can also be implemented voluntarily by construction organizations in countries where they are not 63 
mandated (Robson et al. 2007).  64 
An SMS consists of many components, such as safety management planning, safety policies, safe 65 
work practices, safety training, group meetings, incident investigation, safety rules, safety 66 
promotion, evaluation, selection and control of subcontractors, safety inspection, machinery 67 
maintenance, hazard analysis, and the control of hazardous substances (Teo and Ling 2006; 68 
Fernandez-Muniz et al. 2007; Robson et al. 2007; Hinze et al. 2013; Wachter and Yorio 2014). 69 
These components of SMS can interact with each other in a complex way to affect the 70 
performance of whole SMS (Patel and Jha 2016). Additionally, the performance of an SMS can 71 
be affected by many types of project conditions, such as project schedule, safety management 72 
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budget, worker skill levels, experience of site supervisors, weather (Hinze 1997; Guo et al 73 
2018), and the level of implementation of each component of SMS (Robson et al. 2007).      74 
Accident Precursors 75 
Traditionally, safety performance has been monitored by measuring the frequency and severity of 76 
injuries, such as the Recordable Injury Rate and the Days Away Restricted Work or Transfer. Because 77 
these measures provide historical information—that is, “after-the-fact” data about incidents (p.24, 78 
Hinze et al. 2013b)—they are often referred to as “lagging indicators.” Lagging indicators are useful 79 
for many purposes, such as safety performance benchmarking; however, they are less useful for 80 
proactively mitigating safety risks (Hinze et al. 2013b). Many researchers have noted the limitations 81 
of lagging indicators (Hinze et al. 2013b; Salas and Hallowell 2016; Guo and Yiu 2016; Wu et al. 82 
2010), and have consequently argued for the development of new approaches that can signal when 83 
a SMS is underperforming and prompt construction managers to intervene prior to accident 84 
occurrence (Hinze et al. 2013).  85 
Accident precursors can be defined as conditions, events, or sequences that precede an accident 86 
(Phimister et al. 2004, Saleh et al. 2013); more narrowly, they are undesired events immediately 87 
preceding and leading to an accident (Wu et al. 2010). In this research the latter definition is used 88 
to distinguish accident precursors from other undesired conditions or events such as the poor 89 
implementation of a safety management process. Since events preceding an accident differ 90 
depending on context, accident precursors can generally be identified within a particular industry 91 
or sector characterized by similar conditions. For example, accident precursors have been 92 
identified for railway sites (Kyriakidis et al. 2012), which differ from those identified in the 93 
maritime and ocean freight industry (Grabowski et al. 2007). Similarly, specific accident 94 
precursors have been identified for the construction industry. Wu et al. (2010) have identified the 95 
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lack of protection, workers working without a sufficient operational fall protection, workers 96 
working on a scaffold with inappropriate guard railings as the main accident precursors for the 97 
‘fall from scaffolding’ type accidents. Tixier et al. (2016) indicated that poor housekeeping, poor 98 
visibility, improper procedure, and improper use of PPE are the events before the occurrence of an 99 
accident in construction. Alexander et al. (2017) identified improvisation in construction 100 
processes, poor pre-task plan, limited safety supervision, and fatigue as the precursors to an 101 
accident in construction.  102 
Current Knowledge Gaps  103 
In previous work, the undesirable state of SMS factors (e.g., the lack of a worker safety behavior 104 
program) and accident precursors (e.g., improper use of PPE) were not clearly distinguished; 105 
consequently, the causal links that may exist between them have been overlooked. For instance, 106 
several researchers (Patel and Jha 2016; Robson et al. 2007; Wachter and Yorio 2014; Bottani et 107 
al. 2009; Akroush and El-adaway 2017; Gui and You, 2016; Eteifa and El-Adaway 2018) 108 
investigated the impact of specific SMS components (e.g., budget for safety management, hazard 109 
management practices, site safety rules and worker behavior management efforts) on accident 110 
rates, but they paid limited attention to accident precursors resulting from the undesirable state of 111 
the SMS factors. Some researchers highlight the difference in safety performance between 112 
adopters and non-adopters of SMS (Castillo et al, 2018; Li et al, 2015; Hinze et al 2013). But these 113 
previous studies did not consider the breadth of SMS implementation and its impact on safety 114 
performance. Therefore, an important knowledge gap exists regarding the cause of accident 115 
precursors in relation to SMS implementation and factors affecting SMS performance.      116 
METHODS 117 
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To investigate the complex associations between the condition of SMS factors and the occurrence 118 
of specific types of accident precursors in a quantitative manner, a structural equation modeling 119 
(SEM)-based approach was used in this research. Specifically, the research was conducted in the 120 
following two stages: (1) defining constructs and collecting empirical data for each measure of 121 
SMS factors and accident precursors, and (2) constructing and testing SEMs to connect each type 122 
of accident precursor with SMS factors. The data analysis stage was further divided into two steps: 123 
(1) Confirmatory Factor Analysis (CFA), and (2) Structural Equation Modeling (SEM) and 124 
analysis, as outlined by Hair et al. (2014).  125 
Measures and Data Collection 126 
Based on a comprehensive review of the construction safety management literature, a total of 28 127 
SMS factors (Table 1) and 24 accident precursors (Table 2) were selected for inclusion in the 128 
questionnaire. As indicated in Tables 1 and 2, a priori categories of the SMS factors and accident 129 
precursors were developed based on the literature. The resulting SMS factors were grouped into 130 
six categories: project administration for safety (e.g. safety goals setup (Hislop 1999), 131 
subcontractor assessment (Al Haadir and Panuwatwanich 2011)), risk assessment and control (e.g. 132 
incident investigation, pre-task hazard assessment, site inspection (Hinze 1997)), worker behavior 133 
improvement efforts (e.g., employee engagement behavior-based safety program (Hinze et al. 134 
2013)), commitment (e.g., management team's priority on safety over schedule or cost (Lee et al. 135 
2012; Lee et al. 2005; Choudhry et al. 2008; Han et al. 2014)), resources (both budget and 136 
personnel) (Zou and Zhang 2009), and project adverse condition (reworks (Han et al. 2014); tight 137 
contract schedule (CII 2012; Mitropoulos et al. 2005), lack of availability of skilled workers (Zou 138 
and Zhang 2009)).   139 
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The accident precursors were grouped into five categories as suggested by Wu et al. (2010): 140 
worker-related precursors (workers’ failure to identify hazards (Rodrigues et al., 2015) and fatigue 141 
(Alexander et al. 2017)), work team-related precursors (lack of attention for coworkers (Zou and 142 
Zhang 2009), insufficient foremen experience (Toole 2002)), workplace-related precursors 143 
(housekeeping (Khanzode et al. 2012) or inadequate safety guards and barriers (Reiman and 144 
Pietikäinen 2012; Alexander et al. 2017)), site organization-related precursors (unclear emergency 145 
procedures (Sun et al. 2008) or inadequate site information (Suraji et al 2001)), and materials and 146 
equipment-related  precursors  (inadequate use of tools (Toole 2002) and workers’ exposure to 147 
hazardous materials (Hallowell et al. 2013)).    148 
The questionnaire items were designed specifically to collect data on both the condition of SMS 149 
factors and the likelihood of accident precursors as perceived by the construction practitioners in 150 
their most current construction projects. A more detailed description of questionnaire items, data 151 
collection and preprocessing is provided in Pereira et al. (2018). The final questionnaire (available 152 
at 153 
https://ascelibrary.org/action/downloadSupplement?doi=10.1061%2F%28ASCE%29ME.1943-154 
5479.0000562&attachmentId=5758332) was administered as an online survey. Some items were 155 
measured with a high value (a desirable state) while others were measured in the opposite way. 156 
After data collection, the data were pre-processed so that all variables could be interpreted such 157 
that a higher value means a more undesirable state, whether or not the measure is related to a SMS 158 
factor or accident precursor. 159 
A link to the online survey questionnaire form was distributed to key contact individuals of 15 160 
major construction companies in Alberta, Canada, who were asked to circulate the questionnaire 161 
link to site managers, safety managers, and other construction practitioners in their companies. 162 
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Survey participation was voluntary, anonymous, and confidential. Respondents were asked to 163 
respond to items based on their experience from their current or most recent project to reflect a 164 
single project. A total of 102 responses were received, of which 6 were removed due to 165 
incompleteness; therefore, 96 responses were used in the analysis stage. While the majority (60%) 166 
of the respondents were currently working on an industrial construction project, 31% were in the 167 
heavy construction sector, 6% in the building industry, and 3% in the other construction sectors of 168 
the construction industry. Of those respondents, 24% were also health, safety, and environment 169 
(HSE) managers, 25% were project managers, 21% were superintendents, 19% were other safety 170 
staff members, and 11% had other managerial positions in the construction industry. The 171 
respondents were predominantly from Alberta, Canada.  172 
Data Analysis and Modeling 173 
The data analysis process of this research was guided by the widely adopted SEM process 174 
suggested by Hair et al. (2014). In the process, a confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) is first 175 
performed to confirm that the small number of predetermined constructs (i.e., “Groups;” see 176 
Tables 2 and 3) represent the measures (i.e., individual SMS factors and accident precursors). In 177 
CFA, the reliability of the factors and the convergent and discriminant validity of the scales used 178 
to measure the variables are assessed to ensure the appropriateness of the measures for use in SEM 179 
analysis (Hair et al. 2014).  180 
After the factors (i.e., “groups”) are confirmed through CFA, SEM is used to model the 181 
associations between the factors. The structural components of SEM enable the rendering of 182 
statements about relationships between factors and the mechanisms underlying a process or 183 
phenomenon (Byrne 2009). The SEM method investigates complex inter-relations between 184 
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observed or factors by systematically incorporating CFA, multiple regression analysis, and path 185 
analysis (Hair et al. 2014). The actual structural modeling portion of SEM begins with the 186 
construction of hypothetical structural models, each of which consists of a set of hypothesized 187 
relationships between the factors. The hypothesized structural model is then tested against the 188 
dataset using several goodness-of-fit indices.  189 
Several recommendations regarding the appropriate sample size for SEM have been suggested by 190 
many researchers (Iacobucci 2010; Bagozzi 2010; Lam et al. 2016; Ozorhon and Oral 2016; Zafar 191 
et al. 2018; Sideridis et al. 2014). The sample size in SEM is particularly important to produce 192 
realiable assessment of the model overall fit (Jiang and Yuan 2017). A low sample size can produce 193 
misleading results or in unattainable parameter estimates due to non-convergences in computation 194 
(Deng et al. 2018). As most of the recommendations suggest at least 100 samples for SEM, this 195 
research adopted a bootstrapping technique to address the issue of its modest sample size. 196 
Specifically, 5,000 bootstrap samples were used to test the stability and appropriateness of the 197 
models, as recommended by Hair et al (2011). 198 
RESULTS 199 
Confirmatory Factor Analysis 200 
Because the measurements used in this research are self-reported and collected through the same 201 
questionnaire during the same period of time, a common method variance (a variance that is 202 
attributed to the measurement method rather than the constructs of interest) could cause systematic 203 
measurement errors. To ensure that the data is not substantially influenced by a common method 204 
variance, the Harman’s single factor test was applied. The result suggests that 23.54% of the 205 
dataset variance could be explained by one latent factor, which is much lower than the 50% 206 
threshold for common method variance (Podsakoff et al, 2003). 207 
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The CFA was conducted, and the results of the analysis on the SMS factors are summarized in 208 
Table 3. To examine the factor models’ reliability, the internal consistency of the measures for 209 
each group was tested. Items with a factor loading of greater than 0.6 were accepted to be 210 
unidimensional (Hair et al. 2014). The following SMS factors had a factor loading less than 0.6 211 
and, therefore, were excluded from the factor models: Emergency Planning (RISK5), Substance 212 
Abuse Prevention Program (BEHAV5), Safety Performance Incentive Programs (ADMIN4), 213 
Design Complexity (ADV4), Availability of Skilled Workers (ADV5), and The Level of Required 214 
Worker Compensation Rate (ADV6). 215 
In addition, the convergent validity—the degree to which indicator variables correlate and share 216 
variance with each other—was tested using the Average Variance Extracted (AVE) metric. 217 
According to Fornell and Larcker (1981), it is recommended that AVE be 50% or greater. In addition, 218 
the Composite Reliability (CR) test was used to evaluate the convergent validity of reflective 219 
constructs. According to Hair et al (2014), CR has a threshold value of 0.7. The following factors 220 
(Table 3) satisfied all these criteria, and were used in the SEM analysis process: Project 221 
Administration for Safety (ADMIN), Risk Assessment and Control (RISK), Worker Behavior 222 
Improvement efforts (BEHAV), Project, Commitment (COM), Resources (RES), and Adverse 223 
Project Conditions (ADV). 224 
Table 4 summarizes the results of the CFA for accident precursor measures. Among these 225 
measures, the following had a factor loading of less than 0.6 and were therefore excluded from the 226 
factor models: Worker’s Low-Skill Level (WOR6), Worker’s Exposure to Extreme Weather 227 
Conditions (PLACE4), Inadequate/Inaccurate Site Information (SITE5), and Workers’ Exposure 228 
to Hazardous Material (MATEQ4). The same tests used for SMS factor measures—Internal 229 
Consistency, Convergent Validity, and CR—were also applied to the accident precursor factors. 230 
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All accident precursor factors also satisfied these criteria, and the factor models were therefore 231 
deemed acceptable. 232 
Hypotheses for Structural Models 233 
Based on the CFA results, five SEMs were hypothesized: one for each accident precursor factor. 234 
Each model was designed to examine the associations between one type of accident precursor and 235 
the SMS factors. According to Ullman and Bentler (2003), the first phase in a SEM analysis is the 236 
specification of a model. Although the factor analysis for each construct can be built based on 237 
exploratory or confirmatory approaches, the researcher should hypothesize the causal paths and 238 
directionality between the variables in the model specification (Gunzler and Morris 2015). That is, 239 
a researcher is more likely to use SEM to determine whether a certain model is valid, rather than 240 
using SEM to “find” a suitable model. In this research, the hypothesized relationships for each 241 
structural model were constructed based on the research findings reported in the construction 242 
safety management literature. The hypotheses tested in the structural models are summarized in 243 
Table 5. 244 
Final Causal Path Models between SMS Factors and Accident Precursors  245 
The structural models based on the hypotheses were built using AMOS 24. The internal validity 246 
test—the discriminant validity between the factors—was analysed to verify if each construct is 247 
truly distinct from the others so as to avoid the issue of multicollinearity. According to Hair et al 248 
(2011), the discriminant validity of two constructs is secured if both of their AVEs are larger than 249 
the squared correlation between them (Hair et al. 2011). This condition was met in all five 250 
hypothesized models. Following the internal validity check, two methods were used in the 251 
modeling process for testing, refining, and finalizing the structural models. Firstly, the 252 
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Modification Index technique, the most commonly used method for refining a SEM (Chen et al. 253 
2012), was used to select the variables to improve the fit. Secondly, all models were tested through 254 
a number of goodness-of-fit (GOF) tests. Finally, a bootstrapping technique was conducted to 255 
estimate the significance relationship between factors. The final model validation results are 256 
summarized in Table 6. 257 
The final model for the worker-related precursors (WOR) is illustrated in Figure 1 (Model 1). 258 
Worker-related precursors (WOR) were found to be significantly affected by adverse project 259 
conditions (ADV). Although the standardized coefficient (0.44) of the causal link from worker 260 
behavior improvement efforts (BEHAV) to worker-related precursors (WOR) was higher than that 261 
of the adverse project conditions (ADV) (0.42), the significance of this relationship was not 262 
supported by the bootstrapping test (p > 0.05). As a note, the positive value of the coefficient 263 
between BEHAV and WOR means that worker behavior improvement efforts can reduce worker-264 
related precursors since all data were pre-processed such that a high value means an undesirable 265 
state regardless of whether the variable is a SMS factor or an accident precursor. Similarly, the 266 
causal link from resources for safety management (RES) to worker-related precursors (WOR) was 267 
not supported by the test. The final model suggests that commitment to safety (COM) can 268 
significantly affect resources for safety management (RES) as well as worker behavior 269 
improvement efforts (BEHAV).    270 
The model for Work team-related precursors (TEAM) is illustrated in Figure 2 (Model 2). The 271 
pattern of relationships between SMS factors and the accident precursor factor is very similar to 272 
that of Model 1. According to the model, work team-related precursors (TEAM) would be 273 
significantly affected by the adverse project conditions (ADV). Model 2 also confirms that 274 
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commitment to safety (COM) can significantly affect resources for safety management (RES) and 275 
worker behavior improvement efforts (BEHAV), as shown in Model 1.  276 
The model for the Workplace-related precursors (PLACE) is illustrated in Figure 3 (Model 3). 277 
Model 3 did not support the hypothesis that workplace-related precursors (PLACE) would be 278 
affected by resources for safety management (RES). However, the model suggests that adverse 279 
project conditions (ADV) and risk assessment and control efforts (RISK) can significantly affect this 280 
type of accident precursor. Additionally, the model indicates strong relationships between the 281 
following SMS factors: between commitment to safety (COM) and project administration for safety 282 
(ADMIN); and, between project administration for safety (ADMIN) and risk assessment and control 283 
efforts (RISK). 284 
Figure 4 illustrates Model 4, the model for the site organization-related precursors (SITE).  Model 285 
4 supports the hypothesis that Site organization-related precursors (SITE) are affected by 286 
Resources for safety management (RES), and also by adverse project conditions (ADV); however, 287 
it did not support the hypothesis that site organization-related precursors (SITE) would be affected 288 
by risk assessment and control efforts (RISK). As with Model 3, Model 4 confirms a strong 289 
relationship between the following variables: between commitment to safety (COM) and project 290 
administration for safety (ADMIN); and, between project administration for safety (ADMIN) and 291 
risk assessment and control efforts (RISK); and lastly, between commitment to safety (COM) and 292 
Resources for safety management (RES). 293 
Finally, Figure 5 illustrates Model 5, the model for the Materials and equipment-related precursors 294 
(MATEQ). Model 5 did not support the hypothesis that materials and equipment-related precursors 295 
(MATEQ) are affected by risk assessment and control efforts (RISK), resources for safety 296 
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management (RES) or worker behaviour improvement efforts (BEHAV). However, the model 297 
does support the hypothesis about the influence of the adverse project conditions (ADV) on the 298 
accident precursors. As was the case in the previous models, strong relationships were observed 299 
between commitment to safety (COM) and project administration for safety (ADMIN); and 300 
between project administration for safety (ADMIN) and risk assessment and control efforts 301 
(RISK).  302 
DISCUSSION 303 
The five structural models presented in this paper imply that the occurrence of accident precursors 304 
is systemic. The models also suggest that each of the accident precursors may be linked with one 305 
or two specific upstream SMS factors. Specifically, Model 1 suggests that the accident precursors 306 
related to workers’ conditions and behavior (fatigue, stress and misbehavior) would be mainly 307 
influenced by adverse project conditions such as tight schedules and reworks. This finding can be 308 
supported by the accident causation model proposed by Mitropoulos et al (2005) and Han et al 309 
(2014), which explains that delays in production and tight project schedules can increase workers’ 310 
working hours and consequently lead to the occurrence of incident precursors.  Interestingly, the 311 
SEM suggests that the SMS factors thought to be directly related to worker behavior improvement 312 
(worker engagement programs, behavior-based safety programs, and training programs) may have 313 
a limited impact on those worker-related incidents. However, the authors suggest exercising 314 
caution in interpreting this result: the statistical insignificance (p>0.05 from the bootstrapping) of 315 
the relationship does not necessarily mean the non-existence of the relationship. The model also 316 
confirms the idea that the level of commitment to safety in general that project participants have 317 
would have a strong impact on the efforts and resources for safety performance improvement. 318 
Model 2 suggests that the accident precursors related to the understanding and communication of 319 
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safety matters at the team-level (miscommunication/misunderstanding of safety requirements by 320 
subcontracts/foremen/safety management personnel) would follow a very similar pattern of 321 
causation as was the case in Model 1. The teamwork-related accident precursors would also be 322 
strongly influenced by the adverse project conditions while only a marginally significant influence 323 
was observed between behavior-focus safety programs and the teamwork-related accident 324 
precursors. Again, accident causation models such as the one proposed by Mitropoulos et al (2005), 325 
Han et al (2013), and Jiang et al (2015) can provide some explanation for this observation. Adverse 326 
project conditions can create production pressure and, in turn, such pressure will increase the 327 
chance that important safety-related information is miscommunicated or misunderstood at the 328 
team-level. The results of Model 1 and 2 indicate the importance of change management, 329 
minimization of reworks, and the development of a reasonable timeframe for the project to prevent 330 
accident precursors represented as undesirable worker and workgroup safety conditions and 331 
behaviors.   332 
Model 3 suggests that the accident precursors related to the conditions of a construction workplace 333 
(poor housekeeping, inadequate safety barriers, and congestion) would be significantly reduced by 334 
proper on-site risk assessment and mitigation efforts. For example, pre-task hazard assessment, 335 
site inspection, and constructability review can all mitigate incidents (Patel and Jha, 2016; Eteifa 336 
and El-adaway 2018). In other words, this model tells us that this type of precursor can be 337 
effectively prevented by a well-designed safety risk assessment and with management best-338 
practices. Additionally, this model suggests that a ‘causal path’ exists starting from project 339 
participants’ commitment to safety, mediated through project administrative settings for safety 340 
management (setting safety performance goals and procedures, safety risk-management efforts), 341 
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and ultimately to the prevention of workplace-related accident precursors such as poor 342 
housekeeping and inadequate safety guards/barriers. 343 
Model 4 suggests that the accident precursors related to site organisation, such as unclear 344 
emergency procedures and the lack of mitigation of site environmental/ergonomic hazards, 345 
contribute significantly to the amount of resources dedicated to safety management, such as safety-346 
management budget and specialized personnel. According to these results, site-level efforts to 347 
address environmental or ergonomic hazards can be very costly (Yiu et al 2019) and may require 348 
an significant early-stage endeavor to organize the construction site for better safety , such as site-349 
mobilisation (Shapira et al. 2012). Similar to the case of Model 3, a causal path would begin at a 350 
high-level commitment to safety shown to all project participants, then lead to dedicating a good 351 
portion of budgetary and human resources to achieve high-level safety goals, which may  lead to 352 
organizing a site with minimal environmental or ergonomic risks. As site organization is part of 353 
construction pre-planning, this causal path would need to work from the very beginning of a 354 
construction project for it to be effective in improving the setting and overall conditions of the site.         355 
Model 5 suggests that the accident precursors related materials and equipment usage, (inadequate 356 
use of construction materials, plants, tools, and PPE) can again be significantly influenced by 357 
adverse project conditions (tight schedule and rework) (Guo et al 2018).  Contractors might not be 358 
able to provide all adequate equipment, tools, and materials when the project is under the stress of 359 
tight budget, schedule, or major rework.  Workers and operators also may start to ‘cut corners’ in 360 
using heavy equipment and tools ignoring best practices for safety performance. Contractors would, 361 
therefore, need to manage project conditions such as time, changes and rework, effectively to 362 
prevent accident precursors related to inadequate construction materials and equipment usage.    363 
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One notable finding of this study is the significant influence that adverse project conditions such 364 
as tight contract schedule, a large number of change orders and reworks can have on the occurrence 365 
of most types of accident precursors. The models demonstrate that even when a SMS is 366 
implemented, adverse project conditions can still cause the occurrence of accident precursors. This 367 
finding indicates the importance of a holistic approach to safety management. The mere 368 
implementation of several safety improvement programs/practices may not be powerful enough 369 
on its own to offset the impact of adverse project conditions. Therefore, SMSs should be integrated 370 
into the larger project administration and planning framework, including project design, project 371 
planning, human resources, change management, and quality assurance to ensure their 372 
effectiveness in improving safety performance.  373 
CONCLUSIONS 374 
This study has developed five structural models to explain causal links between SMS factors and five 375 
types of observable accident precursors on construction sites. This research used empirical data on 376 
SMS factors and accident precursors collected from experienced site safety managers, and analyzed 377 
the data using an established and rigorous SEM analysis process. The results of the SEMs enhance our 378 
understanding of the relationships between SMS factors and accident precursors by (1) demonstrating 379 
that adverse project conditions should be controlled, concomitantly, with traditional safety programs 380 
to avoid the occurrence of incident precursors and 2) identifying SMS factors of interest for each 381 
particular type of accident precursors.  382 
The contributions of this research would be three-fold. First, from a practical perspective, the final 383 
structural models can be used to address specific observable accident precursors in a more 384 
informed and proactive manner. This evidence-based, focused approach is expected to enhance 385 
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the value for money of safety management resources by prioritizing measures and interventions 386 
most relevant to specific conditions. Second, this research contributes to the understanding of the 387 
complex cause-and-effect relationship between SMS factors and incident precursors. The results 388 
reinforce that improving the SMS using a comprehensive approach (considering factors such as 389 
performance and design) can reduce the occurrence of incident precursors and, consequently, 390 
allow for a proactive approach for improving safety performance. Third, the models’ results also 391 
contribute to engineering management practice by corroborating or suggesting approaches to 392 
enhance safety management onsite. The results reinforce that resources available for safety, and 393 
implementation of safety programs to control unsafe behavior or to enhance risk assessments and 394 
control on site, highly depend on organizational commitment to safety. The results also suggest 395 
that merely enhancing traditional safety management programs to reduce the likelihood of accident 396 
precursors may not be sufficient on its own. Therefore, organizations should adopt a holistic 397 
approach in all project phases to avoid incidents 398 
The findings of this study should be interpreted in consideration of the following limitations. The 399 
SEM was built based on a sample size of 96 participants, which may be on the lower side for the 400 
SEM analysis. Therefore, it is possible that the models developed in this research were influenced 401 
by the biases that the respondents could have. It is recommended that the models are viewed as 402 
most reflective of the circumstances in which they were gathered: Alberta, Canada. While this 403 
research has used a bootstrapping method to enhance the reliability of the models by introducing 404 
random sampling within the analysis process, further studies based on a larger sample size would 405 
enable further reinforcement of the findings from this research to a greater degree of confidence.  406 
Also, because the respondents were recruited from various types of construction projects, further 407 
research may be warranted to identify project-specific SMS factors and accident precursors. 408 
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Additionally, efforts can be invested to test un-confirmed relationships. The cross-sectional design 409 
of the current study can lead one only to infer causality, rather than prove causality. Future studies 410 
should focus on identifying accident precursors that have a high level of predictive power for actual 411 
accidents. Furthermore, future studies should advance the predictive power of accident precursors 412 
with further validation to select the most relevant accident precursors when investigating their 413 
relationships with SMS factors. Additional empirical testing is recommended to increase the 414 
generality of the models. As different forms of empirical models can be constructed depending on 415 
the dataset, additional testing will assist with validating the generality of the models and the 416 
findings of this research. Causal relationships proposed by the model should be confirmed using 417 
alternate approaches. Currently, causal relationships were hypothesized and tested based on 418 
literature and surveys; direct observations and measurement-based research will increase 419 
confidence of the causal links discussed in this paper. 420 
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Fig. 1. Model for Worker-Related Accident Precursor (WOR) Where: ** p < 0.01; * p < 0.05 644 
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Fig. 2. Model for Work Team-related Precursor (TEAM) Where: ** p < 0.01; * p < 0.05 646 
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Fig. 3. Model for Workplace -Related Precursors (PLACE) Where: ** p < 0.01; * p < 0.05 654 
 655 
Fig. 4. Model for Site Organization- related Precursor (SITE) Where: ** p < 0.01; * p < 0.05 656 
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Fig. 5. Model for Material and Equipment-related Precursor MATEQ Where: ** p < 0.01; * p < 665 
0.05 666 
 667 
 668 
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Table 1. List of SMS Factors included in research (adapted from Pereira et al. 2018) 669 
Group Code SMS Factor 
Project 
administration 
for safety 
ADMIN1 Subcontractor safety performance assessment and screening 
ADMIN2 Establishment of clear safety goals and procedures 
ADMIN3 Establishment of safety committee  
ADMIN4 Safety performance incentive program  
Risk 
assessment 
and control  
RISK1 Incident investigation 
RISK2 Pre-task hazard assessment 
RISK3 Site inspection and auditing  
RISK4 Pre-construction safety and constructability review  
RISK5 Emergency planning 
Worker 
behavior 
improvement 
efforts 
BEHAV1 Employee engagement program 
BEHAV2 Behavior-based safety program 
BEHAV3 Safety awareness meetings with workers 
BEHAV4 Formal safety training 
BEHAV5 Substance abuse prevention program 
Commitment 
to safety  
COM1 Management team’s priority with safety over schedule  
COM2 Management team’s priority with safety over cost 
COM3 Subcontractors’ commitment to safety 
COM4 Management team’s commitment to safety 
COM5 Owner’s commitment to safety   
Resources for 
safety 
management  
RES1 Budget for safety management practices  
RES2 Number of safety management personnel 
RES3 Number of foremen  
Adverse 
Project 
Conditions 
ADV1 Number of reworks 
ADV2 Tightness of contract schedule  
ADV3 Frequency of change orders 
ADV4 Design Complexity 
ADV5 Availability of skilled workers 
ADV6 The level of required worker compensation rate  
31 
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Table 2. List of accident precursors included in research (adapted from Pereira et al. 2018) 671 
Group Code Accident precursor 
Worker-
related 
precursors 
WOR1 Workers under the influence of drugs or alcohol 
WOR2 Workers’ ignorance of hazards 
WOR3 Workers’ high level of fatigue 
WOR4 Workers under high levels of stress due to schedule pressure 
WOR5 Workers’ failure to identify hazards 
WOR6 Workers’ low skill level 
Work 
team-
related 
precursors 
TEAM1 Inadequate communication/enforcement of safety rules within teams 
TEAM2 Misunderstanding of safety requirements by worker or subcontractor 
TEAM3 Insufficient experience of foremen 
TEAM4 Insufficient experience of safety management personnel 
TEAM5 Lack of attention to coworkers’ safety 
Workplace
-related 
precursors 
PLACE1 Poor housekeeping 
PLACE2 Inadequate safety guards or barriers 
PLACE3 Site congestion 
PLACE4 Workers’ exposure to extreme weather conditions 
Site 
organizati
on-related 
precursors 
SITE1 Lack of mitigation of hazardous site environments (e.g., noise) 
SITE2 Unclear emergency procedures 
SITE3 Low level of ergonomic consideration of workspace 
SITE4 The newness of site conditions to workers 
SITE5 Inadequate/inaccurate site information 
Materials 
and 
equipment
-related  
precursors 
MATEQ1 Inadequate use of personal protective equipment 
MATEQ2 Inadequate use of tools 
MATEQ3 Inadequate use of heavy equipment 
MATEQ4 Workers’ exposure to hazardous materials 
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Table 3. Results of CFA for SMS Factors 673 
Code Component – Factor Loading AVEa CRb 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
ADMIN1 0.814      62.25 0.813 
ADMIN2 0.809        
ADMIN3 0.742        
RISK1  0.826     59.74 0.786 
RISK2  0.754       
RISK3  0.767       
RISK4  0.742       
BEHAV1   0.783    55.31 0.734 
BEHAV2   0.763      
BEHAV3   0.761      
BEHAV4   0.662      
COM1    0.864   62.66 0.817 
COM2    0.841     
COM3    0.782     
COM4    0.757     
COM5    0.703     
RES1     0.816  69.56 0.883 
RES2     0.865    
RES3     0.821    
ADV1      0.746 55.12 0.786 
ADV2      0.730   
ADV3      0.687   
a) Average variance extracted (AVE) = (summation of the square of the factor loadings)/[(summation of the square 674 
of the factor loadings) + (summation of the error variances)] * 100 b) Composite reliability (CR) = (square of the 675 
summation of the factor loadings)/[(square of the summation of the factor loadings) + (square of the summation of the 676 
error variances)]. 677 
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Table 4. Results of CFA for Accident Precursors 679 
Code Component – Factor Loading AVE CR 
 1 2 3 4 5 
WOR1 0.819     56.37 0.747 
WOR2 0.789       
WOR3 0.711       
WOR4 0.704       
WOR5 0.673       
TEAM1  0.790    56.41 0.748 
TEAM2  0.767      
TEAM3  0.758      
TEAM4  0.721      
TEAM5  0.717      
PLACE1   0.843   59.74 0.785 
PLACE2   0.779     
PLACE3   0.689     
SITE1    0.814  54.26 0.720 
SITE2    0.799    
SITE3    0.682    
SITE4    0.636    
MATEQ1     0.910 79.41 0.949 
MATEQ2     0.891   
MATEQ3     0.872   
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Table 5. List of the hypotheses included in each structural model 681 
Hypothesis Included-
in Model 
References 
H1:  Worker behaviour improvement efforts (BEHAV) reduce worker-related precursors 
(WOR). 
1 Li et al. (2015); Zhang and Fang 
(2013); Choudhry and Fang 
(2008) 
H2:  Resources for safety management (RES) reduce worker-related precursors (WOR). 1 Cameron and Duff  (2007) 
H3:  Adverse project conditions (ADV) increase worker-related precursors (WOR). 1 Mitropoulos et al. (2009); Nepal 
et al. (2006) 
H4: Commitment to safety (COM) increases resources for safety management (RES). 1,2,3,4,5 Mitropoulos et al. (2005) 
H5: Commitment to safety (COM) increases worker behaviour improvement efforts (BEHAV). 1,2,5 CII (2003) 
H6: Worker behavioural improvement efforts (BEHAV) reduces work team-related 
precursors (TEAM). 
2 Cheng (2016); Wirth and 
Sigurdsson (2008) 
H7: Resources for safety management (RES) reduces work team-related precursors 
(TEAM). 
2 Jiang et al. (2015) 
H8: Adverse project conditions (ADV) increase work team-related precursors (TEAM). 2 Mitropoulos and Memarian (2012) 
H9: Risk assessment and control efforts (RISK) reduce workplace-related precursors 
(PLACE). 
3 El-gohary and Aziz (2014) 
H10: Resources for safety management (RES) reduces workplace-related precursors 
(PLACE). 
3 Reiman and Pietikäinen (2012); 
Mitropoulos et al. (2009) 
H11: Adverse project conditions (ADV) increase workplace-related precursors (PLACE). 3 Spillane et al. (2011); Mitropoulos 
et al. 2009) 
H12: Project administration for safety (ADMIN) increase risk assessment and control 
efforts (RISK) 
3,4,5 Hinze (1997); Park et al. (2015) 
H13: Commitment to safety (COM) increase project administration for safety (ADMIN) 3,4,5 Choudhry et al. (2008) 
H14: Risk assessment and control efforts (RISK) reduce site organization-related 
precursors (SITE). 
4 (Salas and Hallowell (2016) 
H15: Resources for safety management (RES) reduce site organization-related precursors 
(SITE). 
4 Hinze (1997) 
H16: Adverse project conditions (ADV) increase site organization-related precursors 
(SITE). 
4 (Hinze 1997) 
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H17: Risk assessment and control efforts (RISK) reduce materials and equipment-related  
precursors (MATEQ). 
5 Ahmed et al. (2000); Koh and 
Rowlinson (2012) 
H18: Resources for safety management (RES) reduce materials and equipment-related  
precursors (MATEQ). 
5 (Patel and Jha 2016; Guo and Yiu 
2016; Hinze et al. 2013) 
H19:  Worker Behavior Improvement efforts (BEHAV) reduce materials and equipment-
related  precursors (MATEQ). 
5 (Wachter and Yorio 2014; Hinze et 
al. 2013b) 
H20: Adverse project conditions (ADV) increase materials and equipment-related  
precursors (MATEQ). 
5 (Mitropoulos et al. 2009) 
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Table 6. Model Validation Results 683 
GOF Criteria Model 1 Model 
2 
Model 
3 
Model 
4 
Model 
5 
Relative χ2 < 2 is acceptable model 1.179 1.156 1.198 1.203 1.253 
RMSEA <<0.08, not bad fit; <0.05, good fit 0.043 0.040 0.046 0.046 0.052 
IFI >0.9 is satisfactory 0.960 0.964 0.955 0.951 0.941 
TLI >0.9 is satisfactory 0.951 0.956 0.946 0.942 0.931 
CFI >0.9 is satisfactory 0.958 0.964 0.954 0.950 0.939 
PGFI >0.5 is satisfactory 0.648 0.660 0.653 0.651 0.651 
PNFI >0.5 is satisfactory 0.668 0.675 0.671 0.667 0.675 
PCFI > 0.5 is satisfactory 0.817 0.831 0.822 0.826 0.832 
Where: RMSEA (Root Mean Square Error of Approximation); IFI (Incremental Fit Index); TLI 684 
(Tucker-Lewis Index); CFI (Comparative Fit Index); PGFI (Parsimonious Good of Fit Index); 685 
PNFI (Parsimonious Normed Fit Index); PCFI (Parsimonious Comparative Fit Index) 686 
